Theory of Value: Indian Philosophy: Theory of Value 5 (Indian Philosophy, 5) by 2013

Author:2013
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781135703578
Publisher: Taylor and Francis
Published: 2013-10-14T22:00:00+00:00

Elsewhere (1971) I have argued that there is a very important characteristic difference between religious ethics and secular ethical systems: one that concerns the very structure of ethical theory. Let me refine this suggestion here. My thesis is that the supra-moral characteristically is viewed differently in religious ethics than in secular ethics. I shall explain shortly what is meant by “supra-moral.” But first it is important to indicate the implications of the qualifying word “characteristically.”

My thesis is not that all religious ethics treats the supra-moral in the way that I shall describe, or that it is never treated in this way within secular ethics. It is rather that usually the supra-moral is present within religious ethics in the manner to be described, and that much less frequently is it present in this way outside of religious ethics. I thus have in mind “family resemblances” in the sense developed by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations. A cluster of features identify the supra-moral in religious ethics in a way that is not typical of secular ethics.

In what follows, I first explain what the supra-moral is, and how it fits into ethical theory. This will be followed by an examination of the characteristic presence of the supra-moral in religious ethics. Then I shall illustrate my thesis by discussion of the case of Buddhism.

As P. F. Strawson (1961) has pointed out, at the core of morality are the rules that make human society possible. Certainly it is difficult to imagine anything that we could call a morality that did not, at least in some limited way, contain injunctions against forms of behavior (such as murder) which if widespread would render the existence of society impossible. But whereas secular ethical theories may contain prescriptions that go beyond this core, religious theories generally do so, as I will illustrate below.

The distinction between what is considered a moral matter, and what in ethics lies beyond morality, cannot be drawn entirely in terms of the social need for morality. The distinction instead can be explained by extending the analysis of a concept associated with the ethical philosophy of R. M. Hare. This is the concept of prescriptivity. Hare (1963) elaborated upon and defended a view of ethics that he calls “universal prescriptivism.” In Hare's view, part of the meaning of moral judgments is prescriptive in that they typically function as guides to conduct. Not only are moral judgments typically guides to the way others ought to act, but also they are guides to our own conduct.

One way of putting this result is to say that a social and public background pressure (or a latent appeal to such pressure) is associated characteristically with morality in a way that it is not associated with the supra-moral. Another way (another side of the result) is to say that there is a logical connection between societal prescriptives and moral guilt. Moral guilt is not normally associated with the supra-moral. This point will be further clarified in my discussion of Buddhism.

Now to relate these matters to religious ethics.

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